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Introduction
The field of Artificial Intelligence known as knowledge representation and reasoning is concerned with the problem of representing and reasoning about the knowledge of everyday entities called agents. In recent years, much activity in this field has centred on multiagent logics -modal languages whose atomic sentences range over sets and whose epistemic connectives represent operations involving those sets. In this respect, see [10] , or [11] for an introduction, the most intensively studied epistemic connectives are modal operators of the form K a ("a knows that . . ."). Their semantics use two notions of Kripke models: possible state and accessibility relation. Possible states are states of affairs describing what is true whereas accessibility relations are indistinguishability relations between states of affairs characterizing the ability of agents to determine what states of affairs they can discriminate. And most find these traditional notions like possible state and accessibility relation intuitively transparent. Despite the fact that epistemic connectives are sometimes interpreted in more concrete structures defined by means of runs and clock time functions [12] , one of the things which strikes one when studying multiagent logics is how abstract their semantics are.
Contrasting this fact is the fact that real agents like robots in everyday life and virtual characters in video games have strong links with their spatial environment: they occupy positions in it and they see sections of it. Moreover, the knowledge these agents have about their environment mostly depends on the positions they occupy and the sections they see: in the absence of message exchange, a knows that b sees c only if a sees b. These features imply the new opinion that geometrical notions like points and sets of points should be integrated into the semantics of multiagent logics. This tension between a traditional abstract semantics and a new spatial semantics disappears when one realizes that possible states and accessibility re-lations can be defined by means of purely geometrical notions: possible states can be defined by means of the positions in R n occupied by agents and the sections of R n seen by agents whereas accessibility relations can be defined by means of the ability of agents to imagine possible states compatible with what they currently see. In order to elaborate on this idea, we introduce an epistemic language where sentences like "a knows that b sees c" can be expressed.
The syntax of our language, in addition to the traditional epistemic connectives of the form K a ("a knows that . . .") considered in [11, 12] , for example, will include atomic formulas of the form a⊲b ("a sees b"), the truth of which will depend on the position in R n occupied by agent b and the section of R n seen by agent a. In this setting, the above-mentioned sentence "a knows that b sees c only if a sees b" will be written K a b⊲c → a⊲b. Concerning the semantics of our language, in this first attempt at modelling what agents can see and what agents can know, we naturally work with certain simplifications. Firstly, we will require that agents know all the logical consequences of their knowledge. This is the so-called logical omniscience character of agents. For more on the various problems associated with it, see [20, 21] . Secondly, we will require that the visual capacity of agents satisfies the following conditions: agents can see through any agents that may be blocking their view; agents are never faulty, i.e. they always see what they are physically able to see; agents can see infinitely far from their positions; if a sees b then a is perfectly informed about what direction b is looking in.
The project of relating multiagent logics to space sprang from the fictional two-dimensional world of Flatland created by Edwin Abbott in 1884. The third author of the present article developed a logic for studying knowledge of agents along a line where sentences like "a knows that b knows that light λ is on" can be expressed [18] . This logic turned out to have a P SP ACE-complete model checking problem and a P SP ACE-complete satisfiability problem. The original work was followed up then by further work in collaboration with the first two authors that resulted in an axiomatization of a logic for studying knowledge of agents along a line where sentences like "a knows that b sees c" can be expressed [2] . In the present article, we generalize these multiagent logics to spaces of greater dimensions. Its section-by-section breakdown is as follows. Section 2 defines the syntax and the semantics of the multiagent logic we will be working with. In Section 3, we study its expressivity. Section 4 gives the axiomatization in dimension 1 of our multiagent logic. In Sections 5 and 6, we investigate the complexity of model checking problems and the complexity of satisfiability problems. Section 7 presents some variants. Some proofs can be found in the annex.
Syntax and semantics
In this section, we will mostly be concerned with the syntax and the semantics of our multiagent logic. First, we are going to investigate a Cartesian semantics where for some positive integer n, agents occupy positions in R n . Second, we are going to investigate an abstract semantics in dimension 1 where for some linear order T = (T, <) without endpoints, agents occupy positions in T .
Syntax
Let AGT be a countable set of agents (with typical members denoted a, b, etc). The set of all formulas (with typical members denoted φ, ψ, etc) is given by the rule
The intended meanings of a⊲b and K a φ are as follows:
• a⊲b: "a sees b", • K a φ: "a knows that φ".
EXAMPLE 2.1
The formula K a b⊲c can be read "a knows that b sees c".
In atomic sentences like a⊲b, we will always assume that a, b are distinct. This simplification is related to the fact that in Section 2.2, the section seen by an agent is assimilated to an open subset of R n not containing the position occupied by the agent. Let⊲ be defined by
Formulas like a⊲b and a⊲b are called literals. We adopt the standard definitions for the remaining Boolean connectives. As usual, for all agents a, we define the epistemic connectivê K a as follows:
•K a φ ::= ¬K a ¬φ.
The notion of a subformula is standard. It is usual to omit parentheses if this does not lead to any ambiguity. Considering an enumeration (a 1 , a 2 , . . .) of AGT , let k be a nonnegative integer. We use φ(a 1 , . . . , a k ) to denote the fact that φ is a formula whose agents form a sublist of a 1 , . . . , a k . In this case, we shall say that φ is a k-formula. A set Σ of formulas is k-maximal iff for all k-formulas φ, φ ∈ Σ, or ¬φ ∈ Σ.
Cartesian semantics
Let n be a positive integer. As we mentioned in the introduction, every agent occupies some position in the space and sees some section of the space. Hence, the notion of an n-scope will be of the utmost interest for us. An n-scope is a structure of the form (x, S) where x is an element of R n and S is a subset of R n . x and S are respectively called the position of the nscope (x, S) and the section of the n-scope (x, S). In a first attempt at modelling what agents can see and what agents can know, one must naturally work with certain simplifications. A natural semantics to look at would be one where the agents' scopes are cones of various angles, with the agents' positions at the basis of the cones. In a first setting, we will consider that agents' scopes are half spaces, with the agents' positions being at the frontier of the halfspaces. In this respect, we shall say that an n-scope (x, S) is simple iff
• S is an open half space, • x is on the frontier of S. 
We now provide a mechanism for interpreting our formulas in the Cartesian coordinate system R n . An n-world is a function u assigning to each agent a an n-scope u(a). Given an n-world u and agents a, b, if u(a) = (x u (a), S u (a)) and u(b) = (x u (b), S u (b)) then x u (a) and x u (b) are respectively the positions in R n occupied by a and b in u and S u (a) and S u (b) are respectively the sections of R n seen by a and b in u. We will always assume that if a = b then x u (a) = x u (b): distinct agents occupy distinct positions. An n-world u is said to be simple iff for all agents a, the n-scope u(a) is simple.
EXAMPLE 2.3
In the simple 2-world represented in Figure 2 , the positions and the sections of three distinct agents are depicted.
Given an n-world u and agents a, b, we shall say that a sees b in u iff
Remark that in simple n-worlds, no agent can see itself.
EXAMPLE 2.4
In the simple 2-world considered in Figure 2 , a sees b, a does not see c, b sees a, b sees c, c sees a and c does not see b.
n-worlds u and v are said to be indiscernible for agent a, in symbols u ≡ n a v, iff x u (a) = x v (a), S u (a) = S v (a) and for all agents b, if a = b then one of the following conditions holds:
• a does not see b in u and a does not see b in v.
EXAMPLE 2.5
The simple 2-worlds considered in Figures 2 and 3 are indiscernible for agent a.
Remark that ≡ n a is an equivalence relation on the set of all n-worlds. It will be used to interpret the epistemic connective K a . n-satisfaction is a 3-place relation |= n between a nonempty set W of n-worlds, an n-world u in W and a formula φ. It is inductively defined as follows:
As a result,
• W, u |= n a⊲b iff a does not see b in u,
• W, u |= nK a φ iff there exists an n-world v in W such that u ≡ n a v and W, v |= n φ.
We shall say that a formula φ is valid (invalid) in a nonempty set W of n-worlds, in symbols W val n φ (W inv n φ), iff for all n-worlds u in W, W, u |= n φ (W, u |= n φ). A formula φ is said to be satisfiable (falsifiable) in a nonempty set W of n-worlds, in symbols W sat n φ (W f al n φ), iff there exists an n-world u in W such that W, u |= n φ (W, u |= n φ). Let W n s be the set of all simple n-worlds. EXAMPLE 2.6 If u is the simple 2-world depicted in Figure 2 
Abstract semantics in dimension 1
Let T = (T, <) be a linear order without endpoints. As we mentioned in the introduction, every agent occupies some position in the space and sees some section of the space. Hence, the notion of a T -scope will be of the utmost interest for us. A T -scope is a structure of the form (x, S) where x is an element of T and S is a subset of T . x and S are respectively called the position of the T -scope (x, S) and the section of the T -scope (x, S). We shall say that a T -scope (x, S) is simple iff S is an open semi-interval and x is on the frontier of S. We now provide a mechanism for interpreting our formulas in T . A T -world is a function u assigning to each agent a a T -scope u(a). Given a T -world u and agents a, b, if u(a) = (x u (a), S u (a)) and u(b) = (x u (b), S u (b)) then x u (a) and x u (b) are respectively the positions in T occupied by a and b in u and S u (a) and S u (b) are respectively the sections of T seen by a and b in u. We will always assume that if a = b then x u (a) = x u (b): distinct agents occupy distinct positions. A T -world u is said to be simple iff for all agents a, the T -scope u(a) is simple.
EXAMPLE 2.8
In the simple R-world represented in Figure 5 , the positions and the sections of three distinct agents are depicted.
Given a T -world u and agents a, b, we shall say that a sees b in u iff S u (a) contains x u (b). Remark that in simple T -worlds, no agent can see itself. EXAMPLE 2.9 In the simple R-world considered in Figure 5 , a sees b, a does not see c, b sees a, b sees c, c does not see a and c does not see b.
T -worlds u and v are said to be indiscernible for agent a, in symbols u ≡
and for all agents b, if a = b then one of the following conditions holds:
EXAMPLE 2.10
The simple R-worlds considered in Figures 5 and 6 are indiscernible for agent a.
Remark that ≡ T a is an equivalence relation on the set of all T -worlds. It will be used to interpret the epistemic connective K a . T -satisfaction is a 3-place relation |= T between a nonempty set W of T -worlds, a T -world u in W and a formula φ. It is inductively defined as follows:
We shall say that a formula φ is valid (invalid) in a nonempty set W of T -worlds, in symbols
A formula φ is said to be satisfiable (falsifiable) in a nonempty set W of T -worlds, in symbols W sat
be the set of all simple T -worlds.
EXAMPLE 2.11
If u is the simple R-world depicted in Figure 5 
If v is the simple R-world depicted in Figure 6 
Unless otherwise stated, we will always assume that all T -worlds are simple.
Expressivity
AGT being a countable set of agents, the fact that distinct agents occupy distinct positions imply that our multiagent logic forces its models to be infinite. In this section, we discuss some results concerning the expressive power of our multiagent logic.
In dimension 1
Let T = (T, <) be a linear order without endpoints. Our language cannot distinguish between the notion of satisfiability in W iff for all simple 1-worlds u (1) and for all simple T -worlds
then the following conditions are satisfied:
For all positive integers
3. For all positive integers i ≤ k and for all simple 1-worlds
For all positive integers i ≤ k and for all simple T -worlds v
Interestingly,
For all simple 1-worlds u (1) and for all simple T -worlds
Given a nonnegative integer k, let Z k be the binary relation between W 1 s and W T s such that for all simple 1-worlds u (1) and for all simple T -worlds
The simple R-worlds considered in Figures 7, 8 and 9 are in the binary relation Z 
PROOF. Let k be a nonnegative integer such that φ is a formula whose agents form a sublist of a 1 , . . . , a k .
Hence, then there exists a simple 1-world u
Since T is a linear order without endpoints, then there exists a simple T -world u (T ) such that the temporal relationships between a 1 , . . . , a k in u (1) are equal to the temporal relationships between a 1 , . . . , a k in u (T ) . Obviously, u
Since R is a linear order without endpoints, then there exists a simple 1-world u (1) such that the temporal relationships between a 1 , . . . , a k in u (1) are equal to the temporal relationships between a 1 , . . . , a k in u (T ) . Obviously, u
Proposition 3.4 has the following immediate consequence.
PROPOSITION 3.5 Let φ be a formula. The following conditions are equivalent:
2. There exists a linear order T without endpoints such that W T s val T φ.
For all linear orders
PROOF. 2.⇒1. By Proposition 3.4.
1.⇒3. By Proposition 3.4.
3.⇒2. Obvious.
In dimensions n ≥ 2
Let n ≥ 2. Our language can distinguish between the notion of satisfiability in W 1 s and the notion of satisfiability in W n s . To illustrate the truth of this, let us consider the four following examples. As a first example, take the formula
Its validity in W 1 s follows from the fact that if a and b look into the same direction iff b and c look into the same direction then a and c look into the same direction. Its falsifiability in W 2 s is illustrated by Figure 10 where a simple 2-world satisfying a⊲b ↔ b⊲a and b⊲c ↔ c⊲b -hence, satisfying (a⊲b ↔ b⊲a) ↔ (b⊲c ↔ c⊲b) -and falsifying a⊲c ↔ c⊲a is presented. As a second example, take the formula
Its validity in W 1 s follows from the fact that a is not betwen b and c, or b is not between c and a. Its falsifiability in W 2 s is illustrated by Figure 11 where a simple 2-world satisfying a⊲b ↔ a⊲c and b⊲c ↔ b⊲a is presented. As a third example, take the formula
Its falsifiability in W 1 s is illustrated by Figure 5 where a simple 1-world satisfying c⊲a ∧ c⊲b and falsifyingK c ((
s follows from the fact that if c sees neither a nor b then c can imagine the simple 2-world illustrated by Figure 12 where ((a⊲b ↔ b⊲a) ↔ (b⊲c ↔ c⊲b)) ∧ ¬(a⊲c ↔ c⊲a) holds. As a fourth example, take the formula
Its falsifiability in W 
from the fact that if c sees neither a nor b then c can imagine the simple 2-world illustrated by Figure 13 where (a⊲b ↔ a⊲c) ∧ (b⊲c ↔ b⊲a) holds. Finally, for all we know, it is still open whether our language can distinguish between the notion of satisfiability in W 
Axiomatization and completeness
In this section, our goal is to provide the axiomatization of our multiagent logic in dimension 1. Such an axiomatization will enable us to underline the most representative properties of sentences like "a knows that b sees c" when interpreted in R, or in linear orders without endpoints.
Axiomatization
Let G be a finite group of agents. A G-vector is a pair u = (pos u , sec u ) where
• pos u is a function assigning to each agent a ∈ G a positive integer pos u (a) ≤ Card(G), • sec u is a function assigning to each agent a ∈ G an element sec u (a) ∈ {r, l}.
We will always assume that pos u is injective.
It corresponds to a situation where a 1 occupies the 2nd position and looks at its left, a 2 occupies the 1st position and looks at its right and a 3 occupies the 3rd position and looks at its left.
Given a G-vector u and agents a, b ∈ G, a is said to be seeing b in u iff one of the following conditions holds:
• pos u (a) < pos u (b) and sec u (a) = r,
• pos u (b) < pos u (a) and sec u (a) = l.
Remark that in G-vectors, no agent can see itself.
EXAMPLE 4.2
In the G-vector u considered in Example 4.1, a 1 sees a 2 , a 1 does not see a 3 , a 2 sees a 1 , a 2 sees a 3 , a 3 sees a 1 and a 3 sees a 2 .
We now associate to each G-vector u the conjunction χ u of the following literals based on G:
• for all distinct agents a, b ∈ G such that a sees b in u, the literal a⊲b, • for all distinct agents a, b ∈ G such that a does not see b in u, the literal a⊲b.
EXAMPLE 4.3
The conjunction χ u associated to the G-vector u considered in Example 4.1 is
Let a ∈ G. We shall say that the G-vector v is a-compatible with the G-vector u, in symbols u ≡ Remark that ≡ G a is an equivalence relation on the set of all G-vectors. It will be used to provide one of the proper axioms of our multiagent logic. To continue, another technical lemma is necessary.
LEMMA 4.5
The following decision problem is decidable by a deterministic Turing machine in logarithmic space:
Input: a finite group G of agents, an agent a ∈ G and G-vectors u and v, Output: determine whether u ≡ G a v.
We shall say that a set L of formulas in our language is a logic iff L contains all propositional tautologies and L is closed under modus ponens
. Let L min be the least normal logic in our language that contains the following formulas as proper axioms:
where G is a finite group of agents, a ∈ G is an agent and u and v are G-vectors such that u ≡ G a v,
Let us remind that in atomic sentences like a⊲b, a, b are distinct. It follows that in dimension 1, a⊲b ↔ b⊲a and a⊲b ↔ a⊲c can be read as "a and b look into the same direction" and "a is between b and c". There are several points worth making about our proper axioms: 
Completeness
We show first that PROPOSITION 4.6 Let φ be a formula. If φ is in L min then W 
Proposition 4.7 will be proved by a construction similar to the canonical model construction. Let n be a positive integer. As usual, any L min -consistent set of formulas can be extended to an n-maximal L min -consistent set of formulas.
LEMMA 4.8
If Σ is an L min -consistent set of formulas then there exists an n-maximal L min -consistent set ∆ of formulas such that Σ ⊆ ∆.
Let Z
⋆ be the set of all non-zero integers. We will interpret n-formulas in the linear order T = (T, ≺) defined as follows:
• for all α, β ∈ T , α ≺ β iff one of the following conditions hold: -α, β ∈ Z ⋆ and α < β, -α ∈ Z ⋆ , there exists a positive integer j ≤ n such that β = (0, j) and α < 0, -there exists a positive integer i ≤ n such that α = (0, i), β ∈ Z ⋆ and 0 < β, -there exists positive integers i, j ≤ n such that α = (0, i), β = (0, j) and i < j.
It follows immediately from the definition that FACT 4.9 T is a linear order without endpoints.
Let Σ be an n-maximal L min -consistent set of formulas. For all positive integers k ≤ n, k is said to be Σ-right iff k = 1, or k = 1 and (a 1 ⊲a k ↔ a k⊲ a 1 ) ∈ Σ and k is said to be Σ-left iff k = 1 and (a 1 ⊲a k ↔ a k ⊲a 1 ) ∈ Σ. The reader may easily verify that to be Σ-right and to be Σ-left are complementary properties of a positive integer k ≤ n. For all positive integers i, j ≤ n, we shall say that i Σ-precedes j iff i = j and one of the following conditions holds:
• i is Σ-right and a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ, • j is Σ-left and a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ, • i is Σ-left, j is Σ-right, a i⊲ a j ∈ Σ and a j⊲ a i ∈ Σ.
It is worth noting at this point the following FACT 4.10 Let i, j, k ≤ n be positive integers.
i does not
Obviously, for all positive integers k ≤ n, π
We now wish to show that there exists a simple T -world u such that for all formulas φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ), if φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )
Σ be simple T -worlds such that for all positive integers k ≤ n, Not surprisingly, we have FACT 4.12 For all positive integers i, j ≤ n, if i = j then the following conditions are equivalent:
Remind that Z
For all positive integers i ≤ n, let ≡ T ai be the indiscernibility relation between T -worlds defined as in Section 2.3. The following fact is basic. FACT 4.13 Let ∆ be an n-maximal consistent set of formulas. For all positive integers i ≤ n, the following conditions are equivalent:
An important further result is FACT 4.14 Let ∆ be an n-maximal consistent set of formulas. For all positive integers i ≤ n, if
With this established, the rest is easy.
FACT 4.15
Let ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) be a formula. The following conditions are equivalent:
. . , a n ).
W
3. ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ Σ.
The proof of Proposition 4.7 can now be done as follows.
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4.7. Let n be a nonnegative integer such that φ is a formula whose agents form a sublist of a 1 , . . . , a n . Suppose φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) is an L min -consistent formula. Hence, by Lemma 4.8, there exists an n-maximal L min -consistent set Σ of formulas such that φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∈ Σ. Thus, by Fact 4.15, W T s , u Σ |= T φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ).
As a result, PROPOSITION 4.16 Let φ be a formula. The following conditions are equivalent:
3. There exists a linear order T without endpoints such that W T s val T φ.
For all linear orders T without endpoints, W
PROOF. By Proposition 3.5, it suffices to prove that 1.⇒2. and 4.⇒1.
1.⇒2. By Proposition 4.6.
4.⇒1. By Proposition 4.7.
Decidability and complexity of model checking problems
In this section, for some positive integers k, we investigate the decidability and complexity of the model checking problem with respect to W k s : given a k-world u in W k s and a formula φ, determine whether W k s , u |= k φ. The results obtained are summarized as follows: P SP ACE-complete when k = 1 and P SP ACE-hard and in EXP SP ACE when k = 2. Let us remind that in the more traditional epistemic logics considered in [11, 12] , for example, model checking problems are usually decidable in deterministic polynomial time.
In dimension 1
First, we prove the following The model checking problem with respect to W 1 s is P SP ACE-complete. PROOF. P SP ACE-hardness follows from Stockmeyer [22] and Lemma 5.1. Membership in P SP ACE follows from Chandra et al. [7] , Lemmas 3.1 and 3.3 and the fact that the following alternating algorithm (where without loss of generality, we assume that (u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )) is coded as a G-vector with G = {a 1 , . . . , a n }) decides in polynomial time the model checking problem with respect to W a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )), φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) begin case φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) of begin a i ⊲a j : (·) if a i sees a j in (u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )) then succeed else fail ⊥: (·) fail ¬ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n ): (·) begin call mc 1 ((u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )), ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) if this call succeeds then fail else succeed end ψ 1 (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∨ ψ 2 (a 1 , . . . , a n ): (∃) begin choose i in {1, 2} call mc 1 ((u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )), ψ i (a 1 , . . . , a n )) if this call succeeds then succeed else fail end K ai ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n ): (∀) begin choose a G-vector (v(a 1 ), . . . , v(a n )) such that (u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )) ≡ G ai (v(a 1 ), . . . , v(a n )) call mc 1 ((v(a 1 ) , . . . , v(a n )), ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) if this call succeeds then succeed else fail end end end Its execution depends primarily on φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ), each case being existential, or universal. For example, the case ((u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )), ψ 1 (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∨ ψ 2 (a 1 , . . . , a n )) is existential. It is an accepting case iff for some i ∈ {1, 2}, the case ((u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )), ψ i (a 1 , . . . , a n )) is accepting, thus corresponding to the fact that ψ 1 (a 1 , . . . , a n ) ∨ ψ 2 (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is true for (u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )) iff for some i ∈ {1, 2}, ψ i (a 1 , . . . , a n ) is true for (u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )). As well, the case ((u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )), K ai ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) is universal. It is an accepting case iff for every G-vector (v(a 1 ) , . . . , v(a n )) such that (u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )) ≡ G ai (v(a 1 ) , . . . , v(a n )), the case ((v(a 1 ) , . . . , v(a n )), ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) is accepting, thus corresponding to the fact that K ai ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) is true for (u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )) iff for every G-vector (v(a 1 ) , . . . , v(a n )) such that (u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )) ≡ G ai (v(a 1 ) , . . . , v(a n )), ψ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) is true for (v(a 1 ) , . . . , v(a n )). Cases labelled with (·) are both existential and universal. All in all, it is clear that mc 1 ((u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )), φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) correctly solves the model checking problem with respect to W 1 s and that it can be implemented in a polynomial time-bounded alternating Turing machine. Hence, the model checking problem with respect to W 1 s is in P SP ACE.
In dimension 2
First, we prove the following LEMMA 5.3 The validity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the model checking problem with respect to W PROOF. P SP ACE-hardness follows from Stockmeyer [22] and Lemma 5.3. A general strategy for proving a decision problem to be in EXP SP ACE is to reduce it to a decision problem already known to be in EXP SP ACE. A suitable decision problem already known to be in EXP SP ACE is the validity problem of sentences in elementary algebra [4] . The language of elementary algebra is a first-order language with equality. It consists of the constant symbols 0 and 1, the function symbols + and × of arity 2 and the relation symbol < of arity 2. Suppose that we are given a 2-world (u(a 1 ), . . . , u(a n )) in W 2 s and a formula φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ). We shall construct a sentence ϕ ((u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )), φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) in elementary algebra such that φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) is true for (u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )) in W 2 s iff ϕ ((u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )), φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) is valid. Choose distinct individual variables x a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )) in W . . , a n and the coordinates of the endpoints in R 2 of the vectors located at the origin corresponding to the sections seen by a 1 , . . . , a n . Rational numbers being easily definable in the language of elementary algebra, there exists a formula ϕ u (x The translation τ taking nonnegative integers and formulas to formulas in elementary algebra is defined as follows:
Let ϕ ((u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )), φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) be ∀x (a 1 , . . . , a n ))). Remark that ϕ ((u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )), φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) can be computed in logarithmic space. Moreover, the reader may easily verify that φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) is true for (u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )) in W 2 s iff ϕ ((u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )), φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) is valid. Thus, the model checking problem with respect to W 2 s is reducible to the validity problem of sentences in elementary algebra.
Decidability and complexity of satisfiability problems
In this section, for some positive integers k, we investigate the decidability and complexity of the satisfiability problem with respect to W k s : given a formula φ, determine whether W k s sat k φ. The results obtained are summarized as follows: P SP ACE-complete when k = 1 and P SP ACE-hard and in EXP SP ACE when k = 2. Let us remind that in the more traditional epistemic logics considered in [11, 12] , for example, satisfiability problems are usually decidable in nondeterministic polynomial time or in polynomial space, according as there exists only one agent or there exists at least two agents.
In dimension 1
First, we prove the following
The validity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the satisfiability problem with respect to W PROOF. P SP ACE-hardness follows from Stockmeyer [22] and Lemma 6.1. Membership in P SP ACE follows from Savitch [17] , Proposition 3.4 and the fact that the following nondeterministic algorithm decides in polynomial space the satisfiability problem with respect to W algorithm sat 1 (φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) begin choose a G-vector (u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )) call mc 1 P SP ACE ((u(a 1 ) , . . . , u(a n )), φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) if this call succeeds then succeed else fail end where mc 1 P SP ACE is a deterministic algorithm that decides in polynomial space the model checking problem with respect to W 1 s (by Proposition 5.2, we know that there exists such algorithms). It is clear that sat 1 correctly solves the satisfiability problem with respect to W 1 s and that it can be implemented in a polynomial space-bounded nondeterministic Turing machine. Hence, the satisfiability problem with respect to W 1 s is in P SP ACE.
In dimension 2
First, we prove the following LEMMA 6.3 The validity problem of quantified Boolean logic is reducible to the satisfiability problem with respect to W 2 s .
As a result, PROPOSITION 6.4 The satisfiability problem with respect to W 2 s is P SP ACE-hard and in EXP SP ACE.
PROOF. The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 5.4. P SP ACE-hardness follows from Stockmeyer [22] and Lemma 6.3. Membership in EXP SP ACE follows from Ben-Or et al. [4] and the fact that the satisfiability problem with respect to W 2 s is reducible to the validity problem of sentences in elementary algebra. Suppose that we are given a formula φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ). We shall construct a sentence ϕ (φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) in elementary algebra such that φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) is satisfiable in W 2 s iff ϕ (φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) (a 1 , . . . , a n )) be ∃x (a 1 , . . . , a n )). Remark that ϕ (φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) can be computed in logarithmic space. Moreover, the reader may easily verify that φ(a 1 , . . . , a n ) is satisfiable in W 2 s iff ϕ(φ(a 1 , . . . , a n )) is valid. Thus, the satisfiability problem with respect to W 2 s is reducible to the validity problem of sentences in elementary algebra.
Variants
In this section, we discuss several variants not captured by the syntax and the semantics considered in Sections 2-6. For most of them, the axiomatization/completeness issue and the decidability/complexity issue are still unsettled.
Group knowledge
There exists various notions of what may be called group knowledge. A well-known example of such a notion of knowledge for a group of agents is the following: C G φ ("φ is common knowledge in the group G"). The usual semantics definition of common knowledge runs as follows within the context of W
: a ∈ G} denoting the transitive closure of the union of the indiscernibility relations concerning agents in group G. In this respect, see [12] for details, the key valid principles of common knowledge are
However, W 
: a ∈ G} denoting the intersection of the indiscernibility relations concerning agents in group G. In this respect, see [12] for details, the key valid principle of distributed knowledge is
Nevertheless, W 1 s validates formulas that are not valid in a more general setting. For example, choose a finite group G of agents. The reader may easily verify that for all formulas φ(G),
Announcements
We have considered in Sections 2-6 that the knowledge our agents have about their environment mostly depends on the positions they occupy and the sections they see. The truth is that knowledge is also affected by the messages our agents exchange. Following the intuition behind the logic of public announcements, see [10] for an introduction, for all formulas ϕ, let us add modal operators of the form [ϕ] ("after announcement of ϕ, it holds that . . .") to our language. As usual, for all formulas ϕ, we define the modal operator ϕ as follows:
Within the context of a nonempty set W n of n-worlds, W n |ϕ being the set of all n-worlds v in
See [19] for a study of this variant. This variant is interesting because it can be considered as a logic of public communications between agents that look at one another, formulas like [K a ϕ]φ and K a ϕ φ being read "if a knows that ϕ then after the announcement of ϕ by a, φ holds" and "a knows that ϕ and after the announcement of ϕ by a, φ holds".
Visual abilities
We have considered in Sections 2-6 that our agents had similar visual abilities. What happens if agents' sights vary? In Section 2.2, for all positive integers n, we have defined n-worlds as functions assigning n-scopes to agents. If the visual abilities of our agents are similar to those of a radar then the n-scopes assigned to agents can be classed as open n-discs of suchand-such diameter. We shall say that an n-scope (x, S) is circular iff S is an open n-disc and x is the center of S. EXAMPLE 7.1 If one considers Figure 14 in dimension 2, a 2-scope is defined by the point and the open 2-disc delimited by the circle.
An n-world u is said to be circular iff for all agents a, the n-scope u(a) is circular. Let . We have considered in Sections 2-6 that the knowledge our agents have about their environment mostly depends on the positions they occupy and the sections they see. The truth is that knowledge is also affected by the amount of effort our agents put in. Following the intuition behind the logic of subset spaces, see [15] for an introduction, let us add modal operators of the form ✷ a ("whatever the effort a puts in, . . .") to our language. As usual, for all agents a, we define the modal operator ✸ a as follows:
• ✸ a φ ::= ¬✷ a ¬φ.
We shall say that agent a has sharpened its range of vision between n-scopes u and v iff the only difference between u and v lies in the fact that S u (a) S v (a). Within the context of W We first observe that
Let us consider an enumeration a 0 , a 1 , . . . of AGT . Consider a nonnegative integers i ≤ n. Let φ ⊲ i be the conjunction of the following literals:
• for all nonnegative integers j ≤ n, if i = j then a i ⊲a j .
Let φ⊲ i be the conjunction of the following literals:
• for all nonnegative integers j ≤ n, if i = j then a i⊲ a j . Let φ i be φ⊲ i ∧ ✷ ai φ ⊲ i . φ i says that: for all nonnegative integers j ≤ n, if i = j then a i does not see a j ; whatever the effort a i puts in, for all nonnegative integers j ≤ n, if i = j then a i sees a j . As a result, φ i implies that for all nonnegative integers j, k ≤ n, if i = j and i = k 
Conclusion
This article considered a logic for studying knowledge of agents where sentences like "a knows that b sees c" can be expressed. We have studied its expressivity, axiomatized validity in W (1) be a simple 1-world and u (T ) be a simple T -world such that u
(1) Z k u (T ) .
1. Let i, j ≤ k be positive integers such that a i sees a j in u (1) . Since
3. Let i ≤ k be a positive integer and v (1) be a simple 1-world such that u
Consider the set of all simple T -worlds
Since T is a linear order without endpoints, then this set contains a simple T -world v (T ) such that, j 1 , . . . , j l being a list of all the positive integers j ≤ k such that a i does not see a j in u (T ) , the temporal relationships between a j1 , . . . , a j l in v (1) are equal to the temporal relationships between a j1 , . . . , a j l in v (T ) . Since
4. Let i ≤ k be a positive integer and v (T ) be a simple T -world such that
Consider the set of all simple 1-worlds v (1) such that
Since R is a linear order without endpoints, then this set contains a simple 1-world v (1) such that, j 1 , . . . , j l being a list of all the positive integers j ≤ k such that a i does not see a j in u (1) , the temporal relationships between a j1 , . . . , a j l in v (1) are equal to the temporal relationships between a j1 , . . . , 2. Suppose i Σ-precedes j, j Σ-precedes k and i does not Σ-precede k. Since i Σ-precedes j, then i = j and
• (1) i is Σ-right and a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ, or (2) j is Σ-left and a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ, or (3) i is Σ-left, j is Σ-right, a i⊲ a j ∈ Σ and a j⊲ a i ∈ Σ.
Since j Σ-precedes k, then j = k and
• (4) j is Σ-right and a j ⊲a k ∈ Σ, or (5) k is Σ-left and a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ, or (6) j is Σ-left, k is Σ-right, a j⊲ a k ∈ Σ and a k⊲ a j ∈ Σ.
Since i does not Σ-precede k, then i = k, or i = k and
• (11) i is not Σ-left, or (12) k is not Σ-right, or (13) a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ, or (14) a k⊲ a i ∈ Σ.
Hence, we have to consider eighteen cases.
Case "(1), (4) and i = k". Since (1), then i is Σ-right and a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ. Since (4), then j is Σ-right and a j ⊲a k ∈ Σ. Since i = k, then a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Since i = j, then (a i ⊲a j ↔ a j⊲ a i ) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and j is Σ-right). Since a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ, then a j⊲ a i ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(1), (4) , i = k, (7), or (8) , (9) , or (10) and (11) , or (12) , or (13) , or (14) ". Since (1), then i is Σ-right and a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ. Since (4), then j is Σ-right and a j ⊲a k ∈ Σ. Since (7), or (8), then i is not Σ-right, or a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ. Since i is Σ-right, then a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ. Since i = j, then (a i ⊲a j ↔ a j⊲ a i ) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and j is Σ-right). Since a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ, then a j⊲ a i ∈ Σ. Since a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ and a j ⊲a k ∈ Σ, then a i ⊲a k ∈ Σ, or a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 2 ). Since a j⊲ a i ∈ Σ, then a i ⊲a k ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(1), (5) and i = k". Since (1), then i is Σ-right. Since (5), then k is Σ-left. Since i = k, then i is Σ-left: a contradiction.
Case "(1), (5) , i = k, (7), or (8) , (9) , or (10) and (11) , or (12) , or (13) , or (14) ". Since (1), then i is Σ-right and a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ. Since (5), then k is Σ-left and a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ. Since (7), or (8), then i is not Σ-right, or a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ. Since (9), or (10), then k is not Σ-left, or a k⊲ a i ∈ Σ. Since i is Σ-right and k is Σ-left, then a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ and a k⊲ a i ∈ Σ. Since a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ and a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ, then a i ⊲a k ∈ Σ, or a k ⊲a i ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 2 ). Since a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ, then a k ⊲a i ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(1), (6) and i = k". Since (1), then a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ. Since (6), then a k⊲ a j ∈ Σ. Since i = k, then a i⊲ a j ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(1), (6) , i = k, (7), or (8) , (9) , or (10) and (11) , or (12) , or (13) , or (14) ". Since (1), then i is Σ-right and a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ. Since (6), then j is Σ-left, k is Σ-right, a j⊲ a k ∈ Σ and a k⊲ a j ∈ Σ. Since (7), or (8), then i is not Σ-right, or a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ. Since i is Σ-right, then a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ. Since i = j, then (a i ⊲a j ↔ a j ⊲a i ) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and j is Σ-left). Since a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ, then a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Since i = k, then (a i ⊲a k ↔ a k⊲ a i ) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and k is Σ-right). Since a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ, then a k ⊲a i ∈ Σ.
Since a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ, then a i ⊲a k ∈ Σ, or a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 2 ). Since a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ, then a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(2), (4) and i = k". Since (2), then j is Σ-left. Since (4), then j is Σ-right: a contradiction.
Case "(2), (4) , i = k, (7), or (8) , (9) , or (10) and (11) , or (12) , or (13) , or (14) ". Since (2), then j is Σ-left. Since (4), then j is Σ-right: a contradiction.
Case "(2), (5) and i = k". Since (2), then j is Σ-left and a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Since (5), then k is Σ-left and a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ. Since i = k, then i is Σ-left and a i ⊲a j ∈ Σ. Since i = j, then (a i ⊲a j ↔ a j⊲ a i ) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 1 and the fact that i is Σ-left and j is Σ-left). Since a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ, then a i⊲ a j ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(2), (5) , i = k, (7), or (8) , (9) , or (10) and (11) , or (12) , or (13) , or (14) ". Since (2), then j is Σ-left and a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Since (5), then k is Σ-left and a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ. Since (9), or (10), then k is not Σ-left, or a k⊲ a i ∈ Σ. Since k is Σ-left, then a k⊲ a i ∈ Σ. Since j = k, then (a j ⊲a k ↔ a k⊲ a j ) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 1 and the fact that j is Σ-left and k is Σ-left). Since a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ, then a j⊲ a k ∈ Σ. Since a k⊲ a i ∈ Σ, then a j⊲ a i ∈ Σ, or a k⊲ a j ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 2 ). Since a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ, then a k⊲ a j ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(2), (6) and i = k". Since (2), then a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Since (6), then a j⊲ a k ∈ Σ. Since i = k, then a j⊲ a i ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(2), (6) , i = k, (7), or (8) , (9) , or (10) and (11) , or (12) , or (13) , or (14) ". Since (2), then j is Σ-left and a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Since (6), then j is Σ-left, k is Σ-right, a j⊲ a k ∈ Σ and a k⊲ a j ∈ Σ. Since (7), or (8), then i is not Σ-right, or a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ. Since (11), or (12), or (13), or (14) , then i is not Σ-left, or k is not Σ-right, or a i ⊲a k ∈ Σ, or a k ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Suppose i is Σ-right. Since i is not Σ-right, or a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ, then a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ. Since i = k, then (a i ⊲a k ↔ a k⊲ a i ) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 1 and the fact that i is Σ-right and k is Σ-right). Since a i⊲ a k ∈ Σ, then a k ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Since a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ, then a j ⊲a k ∈ Σ, or a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 2 ). Since a j⊲ a k ∈ Σ, then a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ: a contradiction. Suppose i is Σ-left. Since i = k, then (a i ⊲a k ↔ a k ⊲a i ) ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 1 and the fact that i is Σ-left and k is Σ-right). Since i is Σ-left, k is Σ-right and i is not Σ-left, or k is not Σ-right, or a i ⊲a k ∈ Σ, or a k ⊲a i ∈ Σ, then a i ⊲a k ∈ Σ, or a k ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Since (a i ⊲a k ↔ a k ⊲a i ) ∈ Σ, then a k ⊲a i ∈ Σ. Since a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ, then a j ⊲a k ∈ Σ, or a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ (use axiom Ax 2 ). Since a j⊲ a k ∈ Σ, then a k ⊲a j ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(3), (4) and i = k". Since (3), then a j⊲ a i ∈ Σ. Since (4), then a j ⊲a k ∈ Σ. Since i = k, then a j ⊲a i ∈ Σ: a contradiction.
Case "(3), (4) , i = k, (7), or (8) , (9) , or (10) and (11) , or (12) , or (13) , or (14) ". Since (3),
